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The Katowice Administrative Region: A Cause for Concern? 
by 
Eric W. Welch 
Introduction 
The subject of policy implementation is complex and controversial while analysis of 
implementation in transitional economies such as Poland is probably even more so. 
Controversy in the field is due mainly to the lack of consensus about the definition 
and measurement of implementation. In addition, empirical analysis of policy 
implementation in transitional economies is sparse or non-existent and often leads to 
significant levels of speculation. As will be seen below, data used in these analyses is 
also often misleading and provides only a partial picture of how policies are actually 
employed. It is the ambition of this paper to develop a more detailed picture of the 
policy implementation process in Poland by examining how three environmental 
policy instruments are used in one provincial administrative district (Voivodship), 
Katowice, and evaluating how social, political, and economic forces mold their 
character. 
Katowice province is considered an environmental "hot spot" by international and 
Polish standards as a result of its extensive pollution problems. The province has the 
largest emissions of all provinces in Poland and is also one of the most important 
concentrations of emissions of air pollutants in Europe. Additionally, however, this 
geographically small region possesses a full set of complex and complicating social, 
economic and institutional characteristics: high population density; local reliance on a 
small set of state run primary industries; and the entrenched power of a few large state 
corporations that supply Poland with much of the energy and materials needed for 
modernization. These characteristics combine with the new environmental policy 
instruments and pollution reduction goals within the context of a transitional market 
economy to form a complex foundation for bargaining and negotiation between firms 
and administrators and other interest groups that serves as the basis for this inquiry. 
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section will briefly evaluate air 
pollution statistics in Katowice and Poland, indicating that while some improvement 
has been realized, legitimate concerns remain. Following this, a theoretical 
framework of analysis of the implementation process is constructed and a set of 
testable hypotheses are developed. The fourth section presents a more detailed profile 
of the socio-economic, institutional and organizational context found in Katowice 
which is followed by a brief case study of the implementation of three interrelated 
environmental policy instruments in the province'. Finally, the paper develops some 
conclusions based on the study that provide support for the framework as well as 
practical policy evaluation. 
I In this paper the term institution refers to the as the norms, rules and standard operating procedures of 
society while the term organizations comprise the formalized groups of individuals that operate within 
the institutional reference. 
Environmental Policy Implementation in Katowice: What is at Issue? 
Analysis of environmental quality in either Poland or Katowice in isolation from the 
economy is insufficient. This is especially true for the time period under investigation 
(1989 to 1995) because soon after 1989, as a result of the general economic transition 
and the accompanying macroeconomic reforms enacted by Finance Minister 
Balcerowicz from 1990- 199 1 (Novy, 1996), Poland experienced a severe economic 
decline. The extent to which emissions reductions were a result of output reduction, 
industrial restructuring or environmental policy is unclear. However, as Table 1 
shows, declines in emissions in Poland seem to track well with declines in economic 
indicators until 1992 when the economy begins to improve. After 1992, air pollution 
levels seemed to continue to drop while economic indicators rose. 
While these figures indicate that conscious air pollution reduction activity may be in 
evidence, it is not clear whether the underlying causes of this reduction are the result 
of the recession, economic restructuring policy, environmental policy or some 
combination thereof. It is important to understand which forces or policies are behind 
the "implementation" of air pollution reduction activity, especially if it is the case that 
environmental policy played only a marginal role in the emission declines. Future 
management of the environmental crisis in Katowice is dependent upon 
environmental policy that is appropriately linked with economic policies as well as 
effective in its own right. This concern becomes especially clear when Katowice 
environmental indicators are presented (see Table 2 and 3). 
Table 1. Percent Change in Economic and Environmental Indicators in Poland, 
1988-1994 
Total Final Energy Consumption 
by Industry 
Volume of Industrial Output 
Gross Domestic Product 
Total SO2 
Total NOx 
Total Particulate Matter 
Suspended Dust I ug/ m5 1 72.00 1 182.00 1 50.00 
Table 2. Ambient Air Pollution Levels in the Katowice Province in 1993 
Source: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, 1995. 
1989 
-5.5 
0.2 
0.2 
2.1 
6.6 
12.1 
Substance 
SO2 
Lead I ng/m5 
1990 
- 14.5 
-22.1 
-1  1.6 
-17.9 
-1 1.7 
-18.8 
Permissible 
Average 
Annual Conc. 
32.00 
Units 
g/m3 
95.00 
199 1 
-1 1.7 
-10.8 
-7.6 
-6.5 
-5.5 
-13.8 
1626.00 1 200.00 
Cadmium I ng/m" 
Average Annual 
Concentrations 
Minimum I Maximum 
1992 
-7.8 
1.6 
2.6 
-6.0 
-6.6 
-5.9 
4.00 
Source: Nowinska, 1995. 
1.30 
122.00 
1993 
0.2 
7.0 
3.8 
-3.2 
-0.1 
-5.1 
54.40 
1994 
na 
11.3 
5.2 
-2.9 
0.0 
-6.7 
10.00 
Table 3. Comparison of Industrial Emission between Poland and Katowice, 1993 
Poland 
Total SO2 Emissions (Kt) , 
SO2 Concentrations (Tons per Sq. Km.) 
Total Particulate Matter Emissions (Kt) 
Particulate Matter Concentrations (Tons per Sq. Km.) 
Source: Preisner & Pindor, 1995. 
Katowice 
1.78 
547.4 
Heavy Metals Emissions (KgNear) 
Chromium 
Zinc 
Cadmium 
Cobalt 
Nickel 
Lead 
Table 2 shows that ambient concentrations of S02,  suspended dust, lead and 
Percent of 
Total Emitted 
by Katowice 
0.60 
1.9 
cadmium, ranged far above permissible levels at certain times of the year. In the case 
of suspended dust, even minimum levels never fell below permissible levels. Table 3 
shows that concentrations of particulate matter and SO2 are extremely high in 
0.33 
3,133 
268 17 
175249 
3393 
408 
2998 
187390 
Katowice - five and nine times higher than the national average. In addition, Katowice 
province is Poland's main emitter of a number of heavy metals including chromium, 
zinc, cobalt, and nickel. These tables (2 & 3) indicate that air pollution problems are 
far from solved in Katowice, and that significant problems still exist. Not only are 
emissions of air pollution in Katowice high relative to the rest of Poland, but the 
linkage between environmental status and policy implementation appears to be highly 
complex. 
18.8 
572.5 
0.09 
17.3 
While many reports and some analysis point to the fact that air emissions have shown 
steady declines since 1989, no one has actually tried to disaggregate the multiple 
causes of these declines (Preisner & Pindor, 1995; Novy, 1996; Pasierb, 1992; 
Slocock & Sowinski, 1996). While this paper does not promise to define the precise 
extent and origin of the reductions, it does hope to provide some analysis of the 
factors that determine the character of environmental policy implementation in 
Katowice. An understanding of how selected social, political and economic factors 
have driven environmental policy outcomes thus far is important for developing a 
picture of the future viability of existing environmental policy instruments in three 
main ways. First, the extent to which implementation of environmental policy has 
been effective gives an indication of the ability of the province to continue to reduce 
15 
910.5 
19965 
150486 
2569 
408 
2008 
94402 
air emissions in the future. Second, the extent to which environmental policies and 
74.4 
85.9 
75.7 
100.0 
67.0 
50.4 
economic policies are linked, and the nature of those linkages, provides an indication 
of the structural barriers to or opportunities for future emissions reductions. Finally, 
analysis of the institutional and organizational factors that have acted to mold the 
character and use of policies in the past, may provide a good indication of the ability 
to improve or alter environmental policies or their implementation in the future. 
Theoretical Framework, Data and Methods 
It is expected that exploration of how local conditions and policy actors impact the use 
and effectiveness of policy instruments will provide clues to the strengths, future 
viability and needed reforms of environmental policy in Katowice. However, in order 
to better understand the process of policy implementation in Katowice, it is important 
to begin from a specific theoretical perspective. This section will begin with an 
introduction of the general theoretical framework and then focus in on an analytical 
framework for analysis from which a set of testable hypotheses are developed. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical perspective of this research is based on traditional rational choice 
theory in which self-interest of individual actors in the policy arena is considered to 
determine the design implementation and performance of policy instruments2. The 
actors are identified as politicians, government agencies, citizens, interest-groups and 
other professional groups (Majone, 1989). Each actor behaves according to their own 
interests in negotiating policy design and implementation arrangements that determine 
how such things as resource channels and legal constraints are altered. With respect 
to environmental policy, the actors can alternately be divided into the regulators, the 
regulated and third parties (Peacock, 1984; Majone, 1989). It is the interaction among 
these groups in the political process that determines how policies are designed and 
implemented. This paper focuses primarily on the implementation process. 
According to this perspective bargaining and negotiation over the rules of the 
implementation game are continuously in process with each group trading concessions 
in order to enhance the overall interests of their own coalition, and hence retain the 
support of their membership or constituencies. There are three theoretical 
perspectives on the mechanisms of implementation: "top-down"; "bottom-up" and 
"network" (Ferman, 1990; Najam, 1995). Top down refers to a hierarchical view of 
policy implementation in which outcomes are matched with intentions and problems 
stem from issues of authority and discretion. This view determines that policy success 
is essentially a function of how the rules of implementation are written and how the 
lines of authority are structured. The bottom up perspective identifies the 
implementors of the policy, i.e. bureaucrats, as bargainers between higher level policy 
makers and clients or citizens end-users. Bureaucrats are the deliverers of policy and 
as legitimate and responsive government officials, adapt policies through a continuous 
micro-level decision making process that is significantly context specific. Alteration 
of design is considered to be the result of both political and managerial influences. 
Policy network or interorganizational relationship theory (O'Toole, 1986; Bressers, 
O'Toole & Richardson, 1994) considers it impossible for governments to implement 
a specific policy on their own - regardless the extent of authority. Instead, knowledge, 
skills, information and other resources are spread out among the various actors in the 
policy community forming a web of resources that facilitates and formulates policy 
implementation. The extent to which policies are implemented depends to a large 
degree on the coordination of these groups. 
It is acknowledged that focus on self interest of participants in the policy process does not incorporate 
other factors such as altruism and common interest that are also important drivers of behavior. 
This paper assumes that the continual system of bargaining operates in a 
multidirectional manner at multiple levels in the bargaining process such that 
determination of problems, selection of policy instruments, and actual use of the 
instruments for specific purposes is determined by the actors involved (Rein & 
Rabinovitz, 1978; Najam, 1995). The bargaining context is characterized by multiple 
factors that impact outcomes including: stated policy rules; resources; information; 
skills; expertise; interorganizational relationships; and social values and needs that 
come to bear on the policy in question. Within this bargaining context, competition 
exists among the actors, the set of perceived environmental problems, and the existing 
set of environmental policy solutions. For example, i t  may be the case that a region 
well known for high industrial emissions is also a region in which politicians, citizens 
and environmental bureaucrats consider economic welfare to be conceptually 
separated from and/or more important than environmental health. Alternatively, 
another region may be host to environmentally minded citizens, bureaucrats, firms, 
and interest groups are much more influential collectively than are non- 
environmentally minded groups. In each example there are different potentials for 
consideration of environmental problems vis a vis economic concerns. Obviously, the 
existing organizational context, and the power and resources of actors impact how the 
policy instrument is implemented. The following section organizes and clarifies how 
a representative set of the interacting pressures might impact the process of policy 
implementation. 
Analvtical Framework 
Analysis of the local conditions of policy implementation in Katowice province is 
conducted from three perspectives: (1) competing issues; (2) inputs; and (3) context. 
Competing issues refers the natural hierarchy of social and economic concerns 
considered in the policy process. Inputs describes the effects of policy content, 
administrative capacity, and financial resources for the implementation of 
technological or managerial initiatives on implementation. Context concerns issues 
such as commitment to environment, broader organizational networks, institutional 
inertia and firm incentives. Each of these components will be developed further 
below and a representative hypothesis will be included at the end of each section. 
These hypotheses will then be explored in the case study of the Katowice region. 
Competing Socio-Economic Issues 
Within any policy environment there is a prioritization of concerns. This is because 
resources are limited and a hierarchy of human needs exists in which there is a natural 
tendency to favor one concern over another. These competing issues or trade-offs are 
evident in all societies and all policy making organizations. However, they are 
especially important to acknowledge in transition economies in which the ratio of 
available resources to the policy areas in need of attention is particularly low. 
Examples of competing issues are easy to find, but are exemplified by the conflict 
between economic development and improvement of environmental quality. Choice 
among competing issues has especially dramatic social and political effects on 
transitional economies in which aspects of governmental structure are new, standards 
of quality of life are precarious, and alternate social values are often introduced. 
Implementation of environmental policy should be evaluated within this context. 
Hypothesis A: Implementation of de jure environmental policy is hindered by the 
overriding importance of economic concerns. This may be especially true of 
transitional economies whose available resources are minimal in comparison to 
the extent of change required for transition toward a market economy. This trade- 
off between economic and environmental objectives in a resource-scarce society 
acts as a significant barrier to environmental policy implementation. 
Policy, Administrative and Financial Inputs 
Borrowing mainly from the top down approach, the combination of inputs - such as 
policy content, financial resources and administrative structure, capacity and 
coordination - is critical to understanding whether and how policies are implemented 
For example, environmental policies that are overly ambitious may not be considered 
implementable by firms, bureaucrats, political representatives or citizens. In fact, they 
may only have been intended as guidelines or value statements for polluters or some 
broader audience. Resources are always scarce, but the trends with which resources 
are distributed or redistributed give clues to how policies are being employed. 
Moreover, administrative structure, coordination - both horizontally, between policy 
areas, and vertically, between levels of government - and capacity in terms of 
resources and experience are indicators of their overall influence in policy 
implementation. 
Hypothesis B: Structural and functional organizational changes that take place within 
the bureaucracy in response to the broader economic transition (planned to market 
economy), are typically incomplete and fragmented in the short run and lead to 
problems for policy implementation. During the transition governing structures 
that served prior economic and social systems come in conflict with requisite and 
desired changes for the new system. It is during the unstable process of sorting 
out which structures and functions should cease and which should take their places 
that problems for policy implementation arise. 
Implementation Context 
Context represents a set of contributing factors involved in facilitating or inhibiting 
the implementation process. Included in this category are such considerations as 
extent of public awareness, size and aggressiveness of organized pressure groups, type 
and level of firm incentives, and the strength and pervasiveness of the linkages among 
the various organizations with in the policy environment. Citizen groups that 
continuously lobby government for stronger legislation or pressure firms for greater 
emissions reductions, provide a visible force within society that may affect 
implementation. Contexts in which environmental organizations and citizen groups 
are aggressive and maintain formal or informal influence over policy decisions may 
also produce stronger legal instruments and implementation mechanisms than those 
contexts in which accountability to and inclusion of these groups is not apparent. In 
addition to external interest group pressure, internal access to policy design and 
reform by the regulated organizations is another area in which implementation of 
environmental policy may be affected. Firms that are included in the formal policy 
making process may have greater incentive to comply with regulations than firms that 
are excluded. Similarly, organizations whose influence dominates one area of policy 
making (i.e. large firm dominance of economic development policy) may not need to 
respond to incentives established by what my be considered to be a competing policy 
area (such as environmental policy). Finally, the extent to which there are linkages 
between similar and different groups may affect implementation. Strong linkages 
between environmentally activist citizen groups, firms and environmental 
organizations provides a context more suitable for environmental policy 
implementation than contexts in which these types of organizations act in isolation 
and do not acknowledge each other. 
Hypothesis C: While the general transition toward a market economy is often seen to 
imply a greater opening for encouragement and adoption of social concerns (i.e. 
environmental issues), in fact the complexity of the change process provides 
opportunity for previously powerful actors to assert control over certain policy 
areas. A transitional economy in which environmental objectives are subservient 
to economic objectives provides an opening for the environmental policy 
implementation to favor entrenched actors that were powerful before the 
transition. This creates a situation in which solutions to problems created by 
exculded actors are very difficult to implement. 
Data & Methods 
This project comprises a single case study of environmental policy implementation in 
Katowice. The case is divided into two main sections. The first section explores the 
general background of the region's economic, institutional, social and environmental 
character. The second section provides a more in-depth analysis of three interrelated 
environmental policy instruments: the ecological fund, fines and effluent fees. 
Analysis of the three policy instruments in conjunction with the background study 
help to address the stated hypotheses and give insights about the general character of 
environmental policy implementation in Katowice. 
Data include Polish national government and Katowice provincial government 
documents and reports, secondary analyses, statistical records and in-depth interviews. 
Interviews were conducted on-site in Katowice city (the seat of the provincial 
government), and with one exception all were in English. A local interpreter assisted 
with the non-English interview. Interviewees are primarily associated with the public 
sector in Katowice which may be a source of bias in the study. Future analysis should 
incorporate greater input from the private sector and other public or non-profit 
organizations. 
As a means of enhancing the validity and reliability of the results, a method of data 
triangulation is employed. Data triangulation refers to a common qualitative research 
method in which conclusions are built upon cross-referencing multiple independent 
sources of information as a means of increasing the level of confidence associated 
with stated conclusions (Yin, 1984). A survey instrument was designed for the study 
based on written and presented material available at IIASA. The instrument was 
designed in accordance with survey research methodology literature (Fowler, 1993). 
The Katowice Administrative Region 
In general, the social, political and economic landscape in Poland is in transition from 
the politically centralized, economically planned, pre-1989 communist state to a more 
decentralized administration and market economy. Because fewer than 10 years have 
passed since the transition in 1989, characterization of the current path of economic, 
political and social change or of what the future may hold is not simple. Therefore, a 
brief description of the changing socio-economic and institutional landscape provides 
a helpful introduction to the region and establishes a basis for more detailed analysis 
of the policy implementation process in the following in-depth case studies. This 
section will also give an impression about how different aspects of the analytical 
framework interact. 
Economically, the movement toward a market economy could be characterized as 
"taking hold" in Katowice with the share of private sector employees having increased 
from 29 percent to 42 percent between 1991 and 1994 (Preisner & Pindor, 1995). On 
the other hand, the majority of heavy industry and mining is still state owned and 
directed with one of the seventeen large steel mills in Poland now completely 
privatized'. Because state-owned or directed industry still represents a significant 
portion of industrial output and employment in the region, the transition toward a 
market economy can be viewed as sectorally biased with the largest industries of coal, 
steel and power remaining somewhat insulated from market competition. 
Institutionally, the transition has created a situation in which many of the standard 
operating procedures of the previous era remain while new institutions are difficult to 
establish. For example, the power of the coal industry to forestall district heating, 
gasification and low emission environmental policy are significant, while 
environmental interest organizations and citizen activism have been declining 
(Poborski interview; Smith, 1995). The reasons behind the status of each of these are 
complex and result from different causes. The power of the coal industry results from 
the fact that approximately 97 percent of Poland's coal (the worlds 5th largest coal 
exporter) is mined in Katowice and employs a significant proportion of the region's 
population. The coal industry is completely state owned and maintains a strong ally 
in the Ministry of Industry which, in the scheme of national politics, probably ranks 
above the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry. The 
size of labor employed by this industry alone is a significant barrier to restructuring 
policy that results in increased unemployment. Finally, in response to demands by 
lending agencies, energy subsidies designed to facilitate conversion from coal to 
natural gas were removed in Poland. This, in combination with the coal industry's 
policy of providing its employees with hard coal as a form of payment in kind, have 
worked to entrench the coal industry and coal based heating and cooking in the region 
(Sowinski interview). 
In the case of environmental interest organizations, a history as one of the only forms 
of legitimate political activism since the early 1980s in Poland has resulted in a 
negative and combative image which persists today. In addition, early work by these 
groups to alternately paint either a negative or a positive portrait of the environmental 
situation lead to a loss of stature in Katowice (Jezewski interview, Poborski 
interview). Although environmental organizations grew in size after 1989, this rise 
It is true that the process of privatization is progressing with state directed selling of shares to 
workers. However, because of the national importance of these industries and the history of state 
involvement, central government direction of production is still prominent in most large firms. (Novy, 
1996) 
was short lived and membership has recently been falling (Smith, 1995). In addition, 
some of the leaders of these environmental groups are now employees in regional or 
central government agencies - this is true in the case of at least two of the former 
directors of the Polish Ecological Club (Slocock & Sowinski, 1996). Whether this is a 
conscious strategy of co-optation by the government or the result of a natural market 
for skill and capacity in the region is not known. 
In addition to these historical barriers to effective organization of environmental 
interests, there is also a significant rejection of social activism and a fostering of 
economic individualism that pervades the Katowice society. A rejection of social 
activism describes the reaction against communism, centralization, and social 
organization in general. Such a reaction is probably not surprising after many years of 
central control. However, it may also act as a barrier to effective organization for both 
economic or environmental purposes. It is common knowledge that people in  the 
region are much less concerned with environment these days - they are much more 
interested in improving their own economic status (Poborski interview; Smith, 1995; 
Sowinski interview). That Katowice citizens are not environmentally aware is a myth 
propagated by multiple environmental organizations in the 1980s (Jezewski 
interview). Rather, it is an issue of individual priorities - economic concerns of the 
individual are much more important than environmental issues. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the Voivodship is concentrating it environmental education programs on 
the youth (Jezewski interview). Nevertheless, it may be that the natural hierarchy of 
economic well-being over environmental well-being is reinforced by a rejection of 
social activism and an inclination toward economic individualism. 
Organization of economic interests also appears to be affected by the sense of 
economic individualism described above. In response to a questions about the extent 
to which the steel industry lobbies the Voivodship government, interviewees noted 
that while steel firms had established a Steel Industry Chamber of Commerce, there 
was no indication that organized lobbying of environmental policy makers took place. 
Instead, steel firms communicate mainly on an individual basis with environmental 
agencies (Sowinski interview; Szymborski interview). This type of behavior is 
reinforced on two fronts. First, by the fact that there is a high concentration of large, 
state-owned firms in Katowice - the number of employees in any one firm 
representing a strong enough socio-economic interest for agency attention. In 
addition, soon after the 1989 transition the Contract for Upper Silesia (of which 
Katowice is one province) was signed between the central government on one side 
and the economic and social interests and local government on the other. While this 
contract essentially called for the central government to preserve and enhance the 
quality of life of the region, it is clear by its contents that economic concerns rank 
significantly above environmental concerns (Preisner & Pindor, 1995). Nevertheless, 
one begins to the profile of an organizationally fragmented society with respect to 
environmental policy on the one hand, and a marriage of powerful traditional interests 
and economic individualism on the other. How this situation may change as the 
transition continues remains to be seen. 
The structure of the environmental administration also reflects the transitional context 
in which centralized authority is still highly prevalent, while increasing emphasis has 
been placed on greater regional autonomy. In Katowice, tasks and responsibilities are 
divided among central and regional agencies in ways that may prevent strong 
administrative coherence and contribute to a relative dispersion of power. A brief 
review of the environmental administrative structure illustrates this point. 
National pollution reduction goals, ambient air standards and fee and fine levels are 
promulgated by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and 
Forestry. The extent of~these legal guidelines is impressive. For example, in 1990 the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry committed to 
medium term goals of reduction of SO2 emissions by 30 percent, reduction of NOx 
emissions by 10 percent, and reduction of dust emissions by 50 percent by the year 
2000 as compared with 1980 levels (Glinski, 1992; Pasierb, 1992). In addition to 
strong policy guidelines and ambient air standards, Poland has also adopted a set of 
comparatively high emissions fees for a wide variety of pollutants (Slocock & 
Sowinski, 1996). Other policies include embarrassment listings of major national and 
regional polluters and heavy fines for non-compliance. 
The central authorities are also represented at the regional level (49 Voivodships) by 
State Inspectorate offices that are legally responsible for enforcement of 
environmental regulation through inspection of individual pollution sources and 
assessment of fines. Each Voivodship also maintains an Ecological Department 
whose main duties include: (1) issuing of air pollutants emission permits, (2) 
assessment of emissions fees and collection fees and fines, and (3) collection of data 
and conduct of emission inventories for all point sources within their administrative 
boundaries4 (if0 Institute Report, 1993). Therefore, while inspection and legal 
enforcement is placed in the hands of the central government representative (State 
Inspectorate), implementation, licensing and collection activity is placed in the hands 
of the regional Department of Ecology. This structural arrangement creates a 
disjuncture between administrative autonomy based on task and administrative 
authority based on hierarchical power. While this picture of fragmentation may not be 
detrimental under conditions in which a stable system of governance and regulation 
works to control firm behavior, in the case of Katowice organizational fragmentation 
appears effective only for those firms that are active participants in the policy process. 
For those individuals and organizations outside the decision making process, such 
fragmentation probably does little to either induce or coerce environmental behavior. 
Summary 
In terms of the theoretical framework outlined above, competing issues, 
implementation context, and policy and administrative inputs can be seen to frame a 
bargaining scenario in Katowice. Within the last seven to eight years, emphasis on 
market transition combined with a social reaction against organization and a move 
toward administrative decentralization appears to have reinforced industrial interests 
while maintaining environmental interests in the margins. While individual agencies 
are dedicated and concerned with the severe environmental situation, there is 
apparently little in the broader social environment that supports policy implementation 
and much to support the status quo of industry lead restructuring. Simultaneous with 
the devolution of environmental tasks and responsibilities to the local level that has 
The Voivodship office also sets emissions standards for individual firms and develops broad policy 
goals for the region in an attempt to fulfill national targets. 
lead to fragmentation of governmental authority, concentration of industry and labor 
power have reinforced the fragmentation. 
Still, environmental policy is implemented on a daily basis and some encouraging 
signs have been seen regarding reductions of particulate matter, S02, and N02. The 
remainder of this paper examines the three main policy instruments - fees, fines, and 
the ecological fund - in terms of the theoretical frame to show how environmental 
policy tools work in practice in Katowice. 
In-Depth Case Study of Three Interrelated Policy Instruments 
Introduction 
The Ecological Fund, Fees and Fines represent three interrelated environmental policy 
instruments in Katowice. The Ecological Fund is a financing mechanism for 
ecological development in which 40 percent of fees and fines collected are distributed 
to a National Fund, 50 percent to the individual Voivodship funds and ten percent to 
the Municipal Funds. The funds are provided to firms or localities in the form of soft 
loans and grants for everything from complex ecological restructuring to basic 
technological improvement. These funds represent a major portion of all financial 
flows for environmental investment in the Voivodship (OECD, 1995; Szymborski 
interview). Fees are assessed by the Voivodship Department of Ecology based on 
emission levels while fines are assessed by the State Inspectorate on emissions over 
and above licensed allowable limits. Fees and fines represent a significant portion of 
the revenue for environmental expenditures. While the outline of these main policy 
instruments in Katowice appear relatively straight forward, implementation in practice 
is highly flexible and even problematic. The ecological fund case will be presented 
first, followed by a combined presentation of fees and fines implementation. 
Voivodship Ecological Fund 
Funds for expenditures on environmental projects can be divided into four separate 
categories: firms own resources, government run environmental funds, national and 
local budgets, and foreign sources. The category of ecological fund is actually a 
composite of National, Voivodship and Municipal Ecological Funds, of which the 
Voivodship fund has represented between 15 and 27 percent of total funding available 
to firms in Poland between 199 1 and 1994 (Preisner & Pindor, 1995). 
Revenues for the environmental funds are mainly collected through fees and fines 
with about 50% of all fees and fines coming from charges on air emissions. As 
mentioned previously, these revenues are collected by the Katowice Department of 
Ecology and distributed to the National Fund (40%), Voivodship Fund (50%), and 
Municipal Fund (10%). However, within Katowice province, the expenditures have 
favored air pollution abatement projects which have continuously received an 
increasing proportion of available environmental funds since 1991 when the 
proportion of air pollution abatement expenditures was 35%, until 1994 when this 
category of expenditures received 64% of the total (OECD, 1995). The emphasis 
placed on air pollution abatement is appropriate because nearly 19 percent of all SO2 
and 15 percent of all dust emitted in Poland in 1993 originated in Katowice (See 
Table 3). 
While the expenditures have increased, industrial air emission levels have either 
leveled off, or have begun to increase (Figure I ) .  There is an obvious reduction in the 
effective return to investment, and combined with the extreme variations in ambient 
air standards (Table 2), a more critical assessment of the process and targets of one of 
the regional funding mechanisms, the Voivodship Fund, is necessary. 
Figure 1. Indexed Industrial Air Emissions and Investment Outlays for Air Pollution Abatement, 
Katowice(l990 = 0 Outlays; 1990 = 100 emissions) 
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Source: Urzad Statystyczny w Katowicach, 1994 
The Voivodship Fund is an independent agency of the Voivodship government whose 
mission is to provide financial support to projects in which there is a "[positive] 
environmental effect of the investment (Sowinski interview)." While the overall 
criterion for provision of soft loans or grants to firms through the fund for air 
pollution abatement is emission reduction, other criteria exist including economic 
feasibility and permission to build granted by the Department of Ecology (Szymborski 
interview; OECD, 1995). 
Specific priorities of the Voivodship Fund are developed each year through a quasi- 
democratic process in which the Department of Ecology invites participants to take 
part in a debate over funding priorities for the coming year. Participants include 
environmental organizations, research institutes, government representatives and 
industry leaders. At the opening of the multi-day meeting, the Voivodship Fund 
Office presents a list of proposed priorities as a basis for discussion and debate. Each 
participant has the opportunity and right to present alternative rankings or new 
categories of importance. Final agreement is made through a negotiated consensus. 
During this meeting, specific projects are also discussed and decisions are made about 
funding of important regional projects as well. For example, during the 1995 meeting 
it was decided that the Voivodship fund also contribute (in addition to the National 
Ecological Fund) to the restructuring of a desulpherization plant in Jawarno. This is 
especially significant because pollution from this plant affects the Krakow area in the 
neighboring Voivodship. In this case, funding was provided by one Voivodship for 
the benefit of another (Szymborski interview). 
Money from the fund is typically provided in the form of investment credit with 
interest rates much lower than commercial bank rates. Inflation rates have kept 
commercial interest rates well above 30% while funds are loaned at between 10-20% 
depending on the priority of the project5 and firms are generally awarded money from 
the Voivodship Fund based on their contribution in terms of fees and fines. In 
addition, firms that actually pay fees after construction, receive a bonus in which 25% 
of the loaned funds become interest free (Szymborski interview; Sowinski interview). 
Finally, excessive delay in fee or fine payment can result in reduction or refusal of 
future credits. 
In summary, the environmental fund appears to contain a series of promising 
provisions aspects: local priorities are determined by local interests in a quasi 
democratic process; there is an effort to include participants come from different and 
often conflicting perspectives in the decision making process; and loan outlays are in 
accordance with priorities and fee payment behavior. In practice, however, there are 
significant concerns. 
For example, fee payments are based on ability to pay and partial deferment is the 
norm (Szymborski interview; Sowinski interview). Also, the extensive focus on 
environmental effects, concern about social repercussion of plant closures, and 
probably issues of equity among firms, has lead in the case of the steel industry to 
funding of restructuring projects of firms that are too old and should have been shut 
down (Novy, 1996). This perpetuates excess production capacity among state owned 
enterprises while funds are essentially distributed away from the more efficient firms. 
The system of selection of participants may work to bias the prioritization process. 
Established actors may remain in place while few new-comers are brought into the 
debate. In addition, small and medium sized firms are not well organized leading to 
under-representation in the decision making process. Therefore, the structure of the 
institution may become a barrier to funding of projects in small and medium sized 
firms and other low emission sources. As an immediate result, small firms in new 
industrial sectors have relatively little opportunity to obtain access to funding in 
comparison to larger firms in one of the three major sectors. This may be a significant 
future concern because low emission sources are now of strategic priority for the 
Department of Ecology (Katowice Voivodship Office, 1995). 
Finally, the fund appears to be highly conciliatory in which multiple points of 
flexibility are apparent: negotiated fee payment; reduced interest rates; no interest 
bonuses. In general, it may be concluded here that the ecological restructuring is firm 
' In general, the higher the priority the lower the interest rate (Szymborski interview). 
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lead and that government role is limited to investment and funding schemes to entice 
firms to comply with regulations. From a government perspective, as long as 
investments show emission reductions, this strategy is sufficient. Here there seems to 
be evidence showing the defensive nature of bureaucrats and a focus on attaining 
results, not on reforming the process in which results are obtained. 
Fees and Fines 
Polish emission charges remain high. In 1992 SO2 and NOx emission charges were 
set at 82 dollars per ton, while charges for particulate matter were set at 44 dollars per 
ton. (OECD, 1995; Slocock & Sowinski, 1996). In Poland, assessment levels of both 
charges and fines on air emissions have also risen dramatically from 1991 to 1994, 
with charges rising almost 250 percent and fines rising over 1000 percent. Officials 
admit that these policies are revenue enhancing rather than emission-reduction 
oriented. Fee and fine levels would need to be much higher to act as economic 
instruments for pollution reduction (OECD, 1995; ifo, 1993; Slocock & Sowinski, 
1996). However, as Figure 1 shows, there is a significant difference between what is 
assessed and what is collected - especially in the case of fines for air emissions i n  
  at ow ice'. While approximately 80% of air emission fees assessed are collected, 
nearly no fines for air emissions are collected. This points to a very different 
emphasis on implementation of policy instruments that deserves further analysis. 
Figure 2. Collection Rates of Fines and Charges, Katowice 
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In practice, the fee and fine system is highly flexible and contains multiple loop holes. 
In terms of the accuracy of information, the Ecology Department relies entirely on the 
firm to produce an accurate account of its own emissions. The Ecology Department 
does not inspect firms - this is the task of the State Inspectorate. However, the State 
Inspectorate is only an 80 member agency in one of the most heavily industrialized 
regions of Poland. As such, the Inspectorate "is only able to inspect the largest plants 
on a regular basis (Slocock & Sowinski, 1996)." Fines are also rarely if ever paid 
because they are reduced or deferred as a compliance incentive (OECD, 1995), or 
"Although the trend is similar for Poland (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny (GUS)) 
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eliminated based on investment in pollution abatement technology. Fines are not set 
to the inflation rate further removing the incentive to delay payment (OECD, 1995; 
ifo, 1993). In addition, the separate administrative function of fine assessment and 
collection by the State Inspectorate and Department of Ecology respectively, creates 
the disjuncture in the enforcement system mentioned above. Finally, while it is 
theoretically possible to close a firm as a result of heavy and unpaid fine levels, this 
rarely occurs in practice. For example, one large steel mill that is supposed to be 
officially closed due to heavy emission and significant arrears in  fine payment, 
continues to operate in Katowice. This is because there are large social disincentives 
to closure of industrial facilities such as unemployment and economic prosperity 
(Sowinski interview; Szymborski interview). As a result of this entire scenario, firms 
have low incentives to provide accurate information and, relatedly, government 
agencies have low capacity to inspect and enforce compliance. It is not surprising, 
therefore. that fines collection levels are low. 
With respect to the fee system, the incentives to pay are relatively obvious. As 
mentioned in the Fund case above, firms receive finance credits for construction 
comparable to fees paid; interest rates are low and no interest bonuses exist. In 
addition, fees are considered part of investment costs and are therefore included in 
proposals for funding. Therefore, the system directly subsidizes its own fee levels 
such that real fee levels are much lower than they appear. According to this scenario, 
it appears that the fee system bends over backwards to provide incentives for fee 
collection. In the meantime, the economic efficiency of the instrument is probably 
significantly compromised. 
The concerns with the fee, fine, fund system are even deeper, however. While the 
permission to emit is a yesfno decision given by the Department of Ecology based on 
the expected emission report generated and submitted by firms, there are cases in 
which firms build with out submission of the report, build while a decision is pending, 
or build even if the decision is negative. The decision trees is shown and 
consequences are shown below. 
Figure 3. Firm Decision Tree in Katowice 
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It is most likely that many of these firms are small firms with relatively minor (in 
comparison to large firms) construction plans and emission levels. Nevertheless, as a 
group these firms represent a significant proportion of Katowice industry and 
pollution. The feelfine system which together funds about 45% of all expenditures on 
pollution abatement, combined with an estimated 30% of the enterprises own funds 
dedicated to such projects, means that firms fund 75% of their own environmentally 
related projects (Preisner & Pindor, 1995). Because transaction costs are higher for 
small firms and the probability of detection and sanction are low, new source emission 
from small and medium sized firms is problematic. This presents a major problem for 
future ecological development in the region - as yet addressed only as targets in 
planning reports (Katowice Voivodship Office, 1995). 
Conclusions 
In general, the hypotheses developed earlier in the paper tend to find support in this 
analysis. Competing socio-economic concerns of economic health combined with 
economic individualism and a rejection of social collectivism contribute to 
organizational fragmentation in general, but most obviously affect the organization of 
economic and environmental interests. Traditional actors and relationships are still 
very much intact and even new organizational structures such as the Voivodship Fund, 
systematically reduce the potential for inclusion of the complete set of society's 
interests. This fragmented organizational system is also manifested in the separation 
of administrative tasks between levels of government. This results in autonomy of the 
Voivodship Department of Ecology being undercut by the limited enforcement 
capacity, power, and impact of the State Inspectorate (hypothesis B). While this 
system probably works for those large firms who benefit from the incentives of the 
ecological fund, it probably is detrimental to encouragement of environmental 
behavior by non-participants (i.e. small- and medium-sized firms). 
Large firms, which admittedly are also large polluters, have received the majority 
attention by government as a result of their environmental obviousness, traditional 
stature, and economic importance. As a result, environmental policy instruments and 
limited administrative capacity work in favor of these large firms. The accompanying 
fragmentation of administrative power (low capacity and divided structure) results in 
implementation practices favoring the economic needs of large firms. The 
effectiveness of and the current implementation process in the long run as a driver of 
pollution abatement of low emission sources including small and medium sized firms, 
and individual households is questionable. These policies and their implementation 
cater to historically and traditionally entrenched interests in the region and probably 
act as barriers to dealing with the increasingly numerous, small, and less powerful 
actors (polluters). This is a critical point because current trends of economic 
individualism and rejection of social activism may be producing an even greater threat 
to future environmental welfare than previously considered. 
Therefore, it is possible to see that economic and environmental concerns (hypothesis 
A) are not considered to be in competition if the economic self-interests of the 
powerful large firms and dominant industries are assuaged. On the other hand, the 
dominance of state ownership creates no market through which rationalization might 
occur. The continued delay of market restructuring means that environmental policy 
instruments and implementation processes reinforce the traditional position of large 
state enterprises. Inversely, and more seriously, for the small and medium sized firms 
and individual polluters, economic and environmental interests are at significant odds. 
With the limited administrative capacity focused on large firms, there is little check on 
shirking or non-environmental behavior, nor is there much incentive for the increasing 
number of small polluters to comply with regulations. Existing environmental 
policies, while probably designed with the best intentions, may only be effective for 
those entities who have always been a part of the system (hypothesis C). 
Future problems such as emission abatement in small and medium sized firms, district 
heating and gasification will not be well addressed by an administration - limited 
power from division of authority and bureaucratic inertia - that caters to entrenched 
interests on the one hand and that focuses on results - most easily gained by putting 
filters on the limited number of large emitters - on the other. Nor will future 
environmental problems be solved by reliance on policy instruments designed with 
high compliance incentives and low demand for results. These issues will need to be 
addressed not simply from the perspective of new instruments, but also from the 
perspective of repair of the fragmentation of organizational interests, citizen access 
and inclusion, and a break with administrative inertia that continues to focus on large 
emitters. Unless these issues are dealt with, the economic transition currently 
underway may be increasingly hampered by stagnating improvements in 
environmental conditions. 
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